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Abstract
Th   e present paper focuses on the role of domestic resource mobilization for ﬁ  nancing poverty 
reduction strategies. Policy makers should be aware of important macroeconomic trade-oﬀ  s 
associated with MDG strategies ﬁ  nanced from tax increases or domestic borrowing. Th  e  trade-oﬀ  s 
are largely intertemporal: can poor and middle-income countries absorb the initial ﬁ  nancing costs in 
order to achieve expected gains in productivity and human development over time? Th   is calls for a 
dynamic economy-wide framework to identify the importance of such trade-oﬀ  s. Th   e paper presents 
such a framework and illustrates its usefulness in applications for Costa Rica and Ecuador.
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Rob Vos, Marco V. Sánchez and Keiji Inoue1
Leaders from all countries have agreed to pursue the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and reach 
them by 2015 so as to secure a world with less poverty, hunger and disease, better-educated children, greater 
survival prospects for infants and mothers, and a healthier environment. With less than ten years to the time 
horizon, the challenges ahead are still staggeringly vast, though there are some signs of progress. In most 
developing countries, providing every child with primary school education appears to be within our grasp. 
In the developing world as a whole, income poverty has been on the decline and there have been important 
gains in assisted child delivery and coverage of vaccination programmes which have contributed to declin-
ing child and maternal mortality.2 Progress has been uneven, however. Most of the gains in declining income 
poverty in the developing world have been concentrated in much of Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa tends to lag far 
behind for most of the MDG indicators. Child mortality has been on the decline in all parts of the world, 
but again with the least relative progress in Africa. Disparities in progress are also vast within countries and 
many of the poorest tend to be left behind, particularly in rural areas.
Th   e MDG agenda reﬂ  ects an awareness of such disparities and the challenges ahead, predominantly 
in the poorest countries. In this context, many donor countries have made explicit commitments to “scale 
up” aid over the medium term to meet the development goals. Several countries have pledged to reach the 
United Nations (UN) target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI), and other donors have also 
made commitments to increase aid which are not linked to the UN target. Oﬃ   cial development assistance 
(ODA) increased substantially in the ﬁ  rst half of this decade, although the additional resources appear to 
be much more modest after excluding the special debt-relief assistance provided to Iraq and Nigeria. Th  e 
modest increase in aid has come with a more signiﬁ  cant shift in the allocation of funds towards sub-Saharan 
Africa, a region which now receives about 40 per cent of total development assistance, up from 25 per cent 
in 1999. In addition, about 40 of the poorest countries have beneﬁ  ted from relief on bilateral external debt 
under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Further debt relief from multilateral creditors 
for the poorest countries was committed at the G-8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland. Th  ese  commitments 
reﬂ  ect the spirit of the Monterrey Consensus—reached at the 2002 International Conference on Financing 
for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico—to provide more and better aid to developing countries. 
Th   is focus on aid and the poorest countries is logical as the challenges in reaching the MDGs are 
greatest in Africa and other least developed countries, many of which lack the necessary resource base for 
ﬁ  nancing the additional action required to meet the goals. According to estimates of the UN Millennium 
Project, in order to achieve the MDGs, the required additional public expenditures for a typical low-income 
country with an average per capita income of $300 could amount to 10-20 per cent of its gross national 
product (GNP). In the central African region, estimates suggest most countries would require more than 
20 per cent of GNP (UN Millennium Project, 2005). If these ﬁ  gures are accurate, it would be diﬃ   cult for 
those countries to ﬁ  nance the required additional spending through increased taxation or domestic borrow-
ing. Th   erefore, much of the ﬁ  nancing would be expected to come from increased aid ﬂ  ows. Th  is  situation 
has spurred a new debate regarding the trade-oﬀ  s that could be associated with a “scaling-up” of aid by such 
magnitudes. Th  e  eﬀ  ectiveness of such a ﬁ  nancing strategy has been questioned on several grounds (see, 
1  We are grateful to José Cuesta and Alex Izurieta for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and to José 
Rosero and Mauricio León for their support in generating simulation results for Ecuador.
2  See United Nations (2006a) for a recent update on progress with the MDGs.2  DESA Working Paper No. 36
e.g., Heller, 2005; Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2006), such as a lack of good governance and of suﬃ   cient 
absorptive and managerial capacity to eﬃ   ciently absorb substantial aid ﬂ  ows for investment in MDG-related 
actions; the potential cost of an appreciating real exchange rate (RER) and the consequent undermining of 
export competitiveness (often labelled as “Dutch disease”); and constraints on managing macroeconomic 
policy, both ﬁ  scal and monetary, due to the increased reliance on multiple and volatile external sources of 
ﬁ  nancing, as aid ﬂ  ows are typically provided by many donors subject to annual allocation processes.
Such issues are highly relevant for the poorest countries and require careful examination before 
embarking on strategies of massive foreign assistance. Th   is, however, should not divert attention from what 
could be done in terms of domestic resource mobilization, which is another pillar of the Monterrey Con-
sensus, but one that has been less at the forefront of the current debate on ﬁ  nancing strategies to achieve the 
MDGs. Domestic resource mobilization will be central to most middle-income developing countries not 
eligible for increased aid ﬂ  ows and enhanced debt relief. While these countries tend to show indicators which 
set them closer to achieving the MDG targets, it is nonetheless true that about 40 per cent of the world’s 
poor3 live in middle-income countries. In addition, because of the inequalities in human development 
within these countries, as pointed out earlier, there remain tremendous challenges in this part of the devel-
oping world as well. While the less poor countries may have greater access to (private) foreign borrowing, it 
is not entirely obvious that governments would wish to use much of these sources for public investments in 
social sectors and poverty reduction programmes. Greater reliance on domestic resources may imply stronger 
redistributive eﬀ  ects within the economy which could pose political constraints to this kind of a ﬁ  nancing 
strategy. However, more broadly, the issues faced by aid-recipient countries when shifting budgets to MDG-
related programmes and the related relative price and resource shifts may equally apply to countries relying 
on domestic ﬁ  nancing strategies.
In this paper, we will focus on a number of such trade-oﬀ  s and (domestic) ﬁ  nancing constraints. 
In the following section, we will review the main issues at stake and the policy options to address related 
challenges. In a next section, we present the contours of a general equilibrium framework to analyse the 
trade-oﬀ  s empirically and which, subsequently, is applied to Costa Rica and Ecuador, two middle-income 
countries. Conclusions follow in the ﬁ  nal section.
Constraints to domestic resource mobilization in developing countries
Th   e Monterrey Consensus emphasizes that ensuring conditions to enable the mobilization of domestic 
resources is essential for development. Th   is would entail good governance that is responsive to the people’s 
needs; an appropriate policy and regulatory framework; the ﬁ  ghting of corruption at all levels; sound macro-
economic policies aimed at sustaining high growth rates, full employment, stability and poverty eradication; 
ﬁ  scal sustainability; investment in basic economic and social infrastructure; improvement in working condi-
tions; strengthening and development of the domestic ﬁ  nancial sector, enhanced by microﬁ  nance and credit 
for micro- and small and medium-sized enterprises, and the establishment of development banks to further 
facilitate access to credit.
As is the case with aid ﬁ  nancing, domestic resource mobilization for achieving the MDGs may face 
several constraints, particularly in the short run. Without attempting to be comprehensive, we discuss below 
3  Poverty is measured here as the population living on less than $2 a day. Th   e middle-income country group refers to 
86 developing countries with per capita incomes of between $826 and $10,000 (2004 data). Th   e group comprises just 
under half of the world’s population. See World Bank (2006).Constraints to achieving the MDGs through domestic resource mobilization  3
some key macroeconomic policy areas and related trade-oﬀ  s associated with diﬀ  erent ﬁ  nancing strategies for 
the achievement of the MDGs: limited policy space for prudent and countercyclical macroeconomic man-
agement for growth and employment generation; competitiveness and RER constraints; creating ﬁ  scal space 
and maintaining ﬁ  scal sustainability; and labour market constraints.
Countercyclical macroeconomic policies
Economic growth is an essential ingredient for generating domestic resources to attend development needs, 
including human development. But volatile economic growth can hinder a government’s ability to mobi-
lize resources for diﬀ  erent purposes. For instance, extended periods of booms and busts did not allow Latin 
American countries enough time to recover, while domestic savings rates remained practically stagnant dur-
ing the nineties making multi-year planning impossible (ECLAC, 2001). Financial crises have also been the 
single most important cause of increases in urban poverty, particularly in East Asia after the crisis of 1997 
(United Nations, 2003).
More generally, macroeconomic stability strongly inﬂ  uences the long-term growth performance of 
the economy. Macroeconomic stability should be understood in broader terms as entailing more than just 
preserving price stability and sustainable ﬁ  scal balances. It also entails avoiding large swings in economic ac-
tivity and employment levels and, further, maintaining sustainable external accounts and avoiding exchange-
rate overvaluation. Th   e frequency of ﬁ  nancial crises in developing countries indicates that macroeconomic 
stability involves, in addition, maintaining well-regulated domestic ﬁ  nancial sectors, sound balance sheets 
within the banking system and sound external debt structures.
Th   e boom-bust cycles in Latin America during the nineties have closely followed the trend of capital 
ﬂ  ows exacerbated in turn by cyclical macroeconomic policy responses (Ocampo, 2002; 2005). Th  us  the 
capacity to conduct countercyclical policies is a necessary condition to reduce volatility and to increase a 
government’s degree of freedom in times of possible crisis and enable it to have enough resources to protect 
the socially vulnerable and prevent further regress in poverty reduction.
Fiscal policy has been pro-cyclical in many parts of the developing world. Th   is is particularly true for 
Latin America where governments had excessive expenditures during periods of increased credit, such as in the 
seventies, resulting in unsustainable ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits and, consequently, the debt crisis of the eighties. Th  is  period 
was then characterized by both ﬁ  scal austerity and stagnation when the provision of public and social services 
was most needed. Th   e United Nations World Economic and Social Survey 2006 (United Nations, 2006b) shows 
that the ﬁ  scal policy stance in African and Latin American countries has been highly pro-cyclical on average 
since the 1960s, whereas in East Asia it has been either neutral or countercyclical. It further shows that the 
pro-cyclical macroeconomic policy stance has been generally detrimental to long-term growth by exacerbating 
the short-run volatility in the economy and increasing perceived investment risks and uncertainty.
Social expenditures also have been found to be pro-cyclical in many developing countries, some-
times even more so than total expenditures, especially in Latin America (see, e.g., Martner and Aldunate, 
2006). During downturns particularly, public investments in social and other infrastructure tend to be cut 
the most. In Africa and Latin America in particular, this has led to important shortfalls in the quality and 
availability of infrastructure. By some estimates, lagging infrastructural development could account for as 
much as one third of the diﬀ  erence in economic growth performance between East Asian and Latin Ameri-
can countries during the 1980s and 1990s (see Rodriguez, 2006; United Nations, 2006b).4  DESA Working Paper No. 36
Improvements in human development and infrastructural quality require adequate and sustained 
levels of public spending. Infrastructure development requires large-scale investments, which take time to 
mature. Improvements in education and health also entail longer-term eﬀ  orts and require the sustained 
development and ﬁ  nancing of social services. Good infrastructure, education and health can provide im-
portant social gains and this justiﬁ  es the government’s central role in ensuring that society invests in them 
suﬃ   ciently.
Countercyclical ﬁ  scal policies can help smooth the way towards maintaining adequate levels of cur-
rent government spending and public investment and help ensure that spending on education, health and 
infrastructure is not unduly curtailed during economic downswings. For many developing country govern-
ments, the space for conducting countercyclical macroeconomic policies is limited as the available ﬁ  scal and 
foreign-exchange resources tend to be small relative to the size of the external shocks they face.
Uncertainty regarding the timing and levels of aid disbursements hamper budget planning and the 
scope for countercyclical policies in low-income countries which rely heavily on aid inﬂ  ows. In addition, 
these countries often also face signiﬁ  cant costs to aid eﬃ   ciency arising from multiple donor programmes. 
Th   e Paris Declaration on Aid Eﬀ  ectiveness of 2005 calls on all donor countries to align their aid programmes 
for recipient countries and provide more predictable multi-year aid commitments. Along these lines, aid 
could both enhance the space for conducting countercyclical ﬁ  scal policies and more eﬀ  ectively serve the 
resource mobilization for the achievement of the MDGs. As yet, this remains a major challenge and only 
limited progress has been made to date in achieving such harmonization among aid donors.
Moreover, if international measures, such as better-harmonized aid, actions to mitigate the impact 
of private capital ﬂ  ow volatility or debt relief are insuﬃ   ciently pushed forward, there remains some scope for 
developing country governments to enhance the space for countercyclical policies by improving the insti-
tutional framework for macroeconomic policy-making. First, the more appropriate institutional setting for 
ﬁ  scal policy should strike a balance between ﬁ  scal prudence and ﬁ  scal ﬂ  exibility in a way that ensures both 
policy credibility and ﬁ  scal sustainability. Setting ﬁ  scal targets that are independent of the short-term ﬂ  uc-
tuations in economic growth (so-called structural budget rules) can be eﬀ  ective in forcing a countercyclical 
policy stance. Some developing countries, such as Chile, have been able to manage such ﬁ  scal rules success-
fully. Furthermore, ﬁ  scal stabilization funds could help smooth the revenues from unstable tax sources, such 
as those based on primary export production, over time. Th   e experience with the application of such funds 
in various parts of the world has varied. Th   ey are by no means a panacea, and careful management of such 
funds is required. Nonetheless, ﬁ  scal stabilization funds can constitute an eﬀ  ective instrument for resolv-
ing issues of intertemporal trade-oﬀ  s in ﬁ  scal spending by protecting growth-enhancing, long-term public 
investment in infrastructure and human development even during periods of lower tax revenue ushered in by 
external shocks and economic downturns. 
Second, a certain degree of discretionary power should be retained. Since the 1980s, governments 
of many developing countries have moved from discretionary macroeconomic policy arrangements to 
rule-based ones. Th   is shift was founded on the belief that the latter would avoid policy-generated macr-
oeconomic instability. About 20 economies, for instance, adopted inﬂ  ation-targeting as the framework for 
monetary policy. Under this monetary regime, an independent central bank commits itself to price stability 
by publicly announcing the level of inﬂ  ation it will permit. Th   ere are a number of advantages to this kind of 
policy arrangement, including its potential to enhance central bank policy transparency and credibility. At 
the same time, however, the narrow focus of monetary policy on a strict inﬂ  ation target may be detrimental Constraints to achieving the MDGs through domestic resource mobilization  5
to the simultaneous achievement of employment and growth objectives. Rule-based policies may function 
well for some time and when the economy is not suﬀ  ering from major shocks. However, as the structure of 
the economy changes over time, so will vulnerability to external shocks. For instance, ﬁ  nancial shocks may 
become more important than terms-of-trade shocks. In such a changing context, predetermined policy rules 
are likely to become less relevant or turn out to be too rigid. Moreover, as the risks and uncertainties facing 
an economy never present themselves in exactly the same way or with the same degree of intensity, a certain 
amount of space for discretionary policies is always needed in order for adjustments to be made that will 
minimize macroeconomic losses.
Th   ird, macroeconomic policies should be well integrated with other areas of economic policy-mak-
ing. A competitive RER seems to be critical in this regard. In the fast-growing East Asian economies, for 
example, macroeconomic policies were part of a broader development strategy, contributing directly to long-
run growth. Fiscal policies in these economies have given priority to development spending, including in-
vestment in education, health and infrastructure, as well as subsidies and credit guarantees for export indus-
tries. Monetary policy was coordinated with ﬁ  nancial sector and industrial policies, including directed and 
subsidized credit schemes and managed interest rates, to directly inﬂ  uence investment and saving, whereas 
competitive exchange rates were considered essential for encouraging exports and export diversiﬁ  cation. In 
contrast, macroeconomic policies in many Latin American and African countries since the 1980s have been 
focused on much more narrowly deﬁ  ned short-term stabilization objectives, often resulting in exchange-rate 
overvaluation (see United Nations, 2006b; Ocampo and Vos, 2006).
Competitiveness and real exchange rate constraints
While growth is important to ease the path towards MDG achievement, in most countries much greater 
priority will need to be given to public spending to meet infrastructure needs and improve the quality and 
coverage of basic social services. When ﬁ  nanced through aid ﬂ  ows (or foreign borrowing for that matter), 
upward pressure will most certainly be put on the RER, resulting in a loss of competitiveness of exports and 
import-competing ﬁ  rms. Th   is may have important implications for long-term growth, as the export sector 
in many developing countries is an important contributor to aggregate growth and has potential dynamic 
spillover eﬀ  ects into the economy at large. Th   e RER appreciation is often labelled as the Dutch disease eﬀ  ect, 
but this relative price shift can only be called a “disease” if it leads to a resource allocation away from export 
industries resulting in an undesirable structural change away from dynamic production activities.
One way to deﬁ  ne the RER is to see it as the relative price of “tradables” to “non-tradables”. Govern-
ment services, including education and health, and infrastructure are typically seen as “non-tradable com-
modities” and a lot of MDG-related expenditures are therefore considered non-tradables. Consequently, a 
large shift in domestic spending for MDG-related goods and services will push up demand for non-trada-
bles. Th   e price and cost of MDG-related services is likely to increase as a consequence since the government 
will try to hire, more teachers and medical personnel, among others, and may have to increase their wages if 
such workers are in short supply.4 Rising costs of non-tradable services will shift relative prices against trada-
bles, thus inducing an RER appreciation as deﬁ  ned above no matter how the increased spending is ﬁ  nanced. 
Hence, RER constraints may also emerge with domestic resource mobilization for the MDGs.
4  While a shortage of this nature may put upward pressure on wages for skilled workers of this kind, arguably such a 
wage adjustment need not immediately eliminate the labour shortage, since the “generation” of new teachers, nurses 
and doctors will take several years of training. 6  DESA Working Paper No. 36
Th   e actual impact on the exchange rate and competitiveness will depend, however, on many fac-
tors. One factor relates to the impact on import demand. In the case of aid or foreign borrowing, the larger 
the share of foreign resources that is absorbed domestically and the lower the import demand elasticity, the 
greater the real appreciation eﬀ  ect. Th   e impact on import demand will depend on the import intensity of 
MDG-related expenditures, as well as on the multiplier eﬀ  ect of MDG expenditures on aggregate demand 
and the import propensity of aggregate demand in general. Th   e import intensity also matters in the case of 
domestic resource mobilization. Assuming, as already mentioned, that MDG expenditures tend to have low 
import intensity and that most of the eﬀ  ects of such expenditures on overall economic growth and pro-
ductivity occurs with a time lag, then the pressure for the exchange rate to appreciate in the short run may 
be great, no matter the source of ﬁ  nancing. Second, the short-run pressure on domestic prices will further 
depend on the existing production capacity and will be less if there is scope for extending the coverage of 
services without much additional investment. Th   ird, MDG services like education and health may be heavily 
subsidized and oﬀ  ered with more or less ﬁ  xed prices. Furthermore, under such conditions relative prices may 
still move against tradables, if taxation or domestic government borrowing crowds out private demand for 
tradables and lowers the price of such commodities. Fourth, the impact will depend on the exchange-rate 
regime and access to foreign borrowing. If the domestic resource mobilization for MDG achievement leads 
to a relative price shift against tradables, this could induce a growing trade deﬁ  cit. If this can be covered by 
foreign borrowing or investment, then the tendency towards an RER appreciation will be strengthened. If 
there is insuﬃ   cient access to foreign savings, the nominal exchange rate would need to devalue, thus counter-
acting the initial relative price shift. For countries with ﬁ  xed exchange-rate regimes or dollarized economies 
and with limited access to foreign ﬁ  nancing, something else will need to give. Most likely, private domestic 
spending would need to contract to compress import demand and thereby contain the ensuing increase of 
the trade deﬁ  cit. Finally, the impact on competitiveness of upward pressure on the RER will also depend 
on how greater achievement of the MDGs will aﬀ  ect the economy over time. Better infrastructure and a 
better-educated and healthier labour force may have important externalities in the form of productivity 
growth, attract foreign investors and thereby have a dynamic impact on economic growth. Th   is presents an 
intertemporal trade-oﬀ  , because the RER appreciation would erode export competitiveness in the short run, 
while productivity gains and faster economic growth from increased MDG achievement would pay oﬀ   in the 
long run. Th   e question then is whether the negative short-run eﬀ  ects can be contained so as not to limit the 
resources available for long-term investments in human capital.
Th   e empirical literature on Dutch disease shows a wide range of RER adjustments in response to 
strong increases in aid ﬂ  ows, and the size of the eﬀ  ects largely depend on the relative demand and supply 
eﬀ  ects across sectors, and thus on country-speciﬁ  c circumstances (Bevan, 2005; Heller, 2005; Bourguignon 
and Sundberg, 2006; and Gupta, Powell and Yang, 2006). Similarly, the degree to which increased taxa-
tion or domestic government borrowing will change the composition of domestic demand will depend on 
how private investors respond to higher public indebtedness and possible higher domestic interest rates, and 
which parts of the population have to carry the extra tax burden, and so on.
In summary, the risk of a loss of export competitiveness due to larger MDG expenditures is clear 
and present also in the case of domestic ﬁ  nancing, but one cannot say a priori that a poverty reduction 
strategy aiming at increased public expenditures for the MDGs would be harmful for growth or exports. 
Th   e long-term economic gains from improved MDG achievement are diﬃ   cult to predict, however, and the 
interactions with changes in the economic structure of the economy are highly complex and depend on the 
institutional features of the economy.Constraints to achieving the MDGs through domestic resource mobilization  7
Creating ﬁ  scal space for MDG investment
Tax reform
Taxation should be central to any strategy for domestic resource mobilization aimed at enhancing public 
expenditures for social development. Many developing countries would seem to have signiﬁ  cant scope for 
increasing the tax eﬀ  ort. In Latin America, for instance, average tax revenues amounted to only 17 per cent 
of GDP in 2004, less than half of the average for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD). Only Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay had tax revenues above 25 per cent of GDP (Martner 
and Aldunate, 2006). Total government revenues, which include gains from export commodities of public 
enterprises, capital revenues and social security contributions, are less than 25 per cent of GDP on average. 
Indirect taxation in Latin America accounts for the bulk of the revenues, with direct taxes bringing in only 
about one ﬁ  fth of the revenues. Among the revenues from indirect taxation, the value-added tax (VAT) is the 
most important instrument in Latin America, especially now that most countries rely much less on import 
duties and other trade taxes as a result of trade liberalization. Th   e smaller economies, such as those in Central 
America and the Caribbean, for example, have been highly dependent on trade taxes, but these revenues 
have been on the decline since the nineties (Escaith and Inoue, 2001). Although the VAT rate varies greatly 
by country in Latin America and is diﬀ  erentiated in some countries according to the type of product, the 
average rate is around 15 per cent, which is 5 points lower than the OECD average. Since raising the VAT 
rate can be politically diﬃ   cult, VAT reforms should ﬁ  rst concentrate on reducing evasion and increasing col-
lection eﬃ   ciency. 
In most Latin American countries there is much scope for increasing ﬁ  scal space through direct 
taxation of personal and corporate incomes, although high evasion rates signal political constraints here also. 
Moreover, in recent years, income tax reforms in Latin America have focused in general on decreasing the 
high-end marginal tax rates by about 3 percentage points on average while increasing the lower-end marginal 
rates by more than two percentage points and reducing the number of taxable income brackets, making 
direct taxation more regressive (Martner and Aldunate, 2006).
Increased taxation may aﬀ  ect domestic demand as consumers will have less disposable income 
and investors may foresee lower net proﬁ  ts. Moreover, reduced disposable income and proﬁ  ts are likely to 
constrain private savings for investment ﬁ  nancing. Th   e domestic demand eﬀ  ect will also depend on who is 
to carry the additional tax burden. If indirect taxes have a greater eﬀ  ect on low-income households, re-
forms pushing for increases in VAT and other indirect taxes could then oﬀ  set some of the welfare gains the 
poor would have received from enhanced MDG expenditures. In addition, if increased tax eﬀ  orts are more 
distribution neutral, they could aﬀ  ect the poor through lower economic growth in the short run as private 
domestic demand would fall. Increased public expenditures would compensate for this, but the long-run 
growth eﬀ  ects would depend on the eﬃ   ciency of these expenditures.
Eﬃ   cient budget allocations
A great deal of focus has been given to the additional spending requirements in recent discussions about the 
costing of the MDGs. However, one should not lose sight of the ample scope in many countries for more 
eﬀ  ective budget allocations in favour of poverty reduction and other MDG-related programmes. Th  ese  will 
likely be contentious political issues as well, since they will touch upon a broader social priority setting. In 
many developing countries, much of the budgeting process tends to involve debate around marginal in-
creases from the previous year’s budget evolving around pressures from various interest groups. Much of this 8  DESA Working Paper No. 36
process also tends to have, at best, a very loose relationship with needs assessments and costing exercises of 
actual development programmes. Th   is has become clear once more in the context of many of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) prepared in the context of the debt relief oﬀ  ered as part of the HIPC 
Initiative. Links between proposed actions in the PRSPs and budget requirements and priorities have typi-
cally remained rather vague and poorly speciﬁ  ed. Support to countries in the context of the Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) developed by the World Bank intends to strengthen these links, but the 
implementation of the framework has not proven to be easy as some studies show (see, e.g., ODI, 2003; Vos 
and Cabezas, 2006; Vos, Cabezas and Komives, 2006). Much of the implied diﬃ   culties are of course politi-
cal, but a well-deﬁ  ned MTEF could in principle help to overcome such hurdles by making the priority set-
ting more explicit and by tying the budget allocations to actions and expected outcomes and, hence, making 
the budgeting process more transparent and enhancing accountability.
When trying to gain ﬁ  scal space for MDG-related spending, there are at least three levels at which 
one could seek greater eﬀ  ectiveness in government spending. First, resetting priorities across budget items 
could create more space for MDG-related spending. Th   is could entail readjustments across government sec-
tors or ministries (e.g., from defence spending to education and health), or across subsectors within minis-
tries or programmes (e.g., from higher education to primary and secondary education).
Second, there may be scope for improving the eﬃ   ciency in the delivery of services. Th   e quality and 
eﬃ   ciency with which public services are provided will diﬀ  er from country to country and ineﬃ   ciencies can 
emerge for a variety of reasons. In some cases there may be blatant ineﬃ   ciencies, however, such as absentee-
ism among teaching and medical personnel, which, if dealt with, could entail important ﬁ  scal savings. For 
instance, primary school teacher absence rates have been found to be as high as 27 per cent in Uganda, 25 
per cent in India, 19 per cent in Indonesia, and 14 per cent in Ecuador (see Rogers and others, 2004). In the 
case of Ecuador, for instance, it has been estimated that reducing primary school teacher absenteeism by half 
could “save” about 2 per cent of the overall budget for the education sector. In the health care sector, a short-
age of medical personnel may not be the only, or even the main, problem for improving coverage of health 
services. For instance, doctors and nurses tend to be mostly present in the main urban centres, leaving the 
rest of the country uncovered (see, e.g., Vos and others, 2004; World Bank, 2004). Problems such as these 
and many others suggest that with a more eﬃ   cient delivery of services the same amount of resources could 
yield much higher outcomes in education and health. 
Th   ird, even without such ineﬃ   ciencies in delivery systems, MDG-related spending could be made 
more cost-eﬀ  ective by ensuring that within programmes and subsectors resources are prioritized towards 
those “inputs” and activities which produce the larger outcome per dollar spent. For instance, a cost-eﬀ  ec-
tiveness analysis of the actions needed to meet the target of universal primary education in Ecuador suggest-
ed that with a more eﬃ   cient allocation of resources it would be possible to achieve the education MDG at 
an annual extra cost of 0.2 per cent of GDP; it could even be at zero extra cost if the rather generous existing 
pupil-teacher ratio in primary education was allowed to increase from 23 to 25 (Vos and Ponce 2004). Spe-
ciﬁ  cally, a more cost-eﬀ  ective allocation of resources would entail focusing incremental budget resources on 
hiring better-trained teachers, expanding a conditional cash transfer programme to stimulate school attend-
ance by the poor and improving the availability of rural schooling infrastructure. More generally, compari-
sons of such cost-eﬀ  ectiveness analyses for education and health in diﬀ  erent country contexts suggest that 
the bottlenecks in achieving MDG targets tend to be country-speciﬁ  c depending on existing delivery systems 
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more cost-eﬀ  ective budget allocations could yield important ﬁ  scal savings when compared to needs assess-
ments based on existing allocation patterns. 
In order to measure the quality and eﬃ   ciency of social programmes, some countries have already 
adopted public investment registries and evaluation systems. In theory, these would accord policy makers a 
tool to identify the most eﬃ   cient or cost-eﬀ  ective programmes and allocate resources accordingly. However, 
in practice, these systems may encounter opposition from stakeholders and may lack suﬃ   cient political sup-
port to achieve the objective of more eﬃ   cient redistribution of resources (ECLAC, 2002; Vos and Ponce, 
2004; Martner and Aldunate, 2006).
Domestic borrowing and ﬁ  scal sustainability
In the short run, revenues and expenditures determine an important part of the domestic resources 
available for social development. However, in the medium and long run, what happens “below the line” of 
ﬁ  scal accounts (i.e., the ﬁ  nancing of deﬁ  cits) will determine the sustainability of ﬁ  scal resources. 
In the case of heavily indebted poor countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
International Development Association (IDA) monitor their debt situation and needs. More recently, a Debt 
Sustainability Framework was established to detect the debt-related vulnerabilities of the HIPCs and prevent 
unsustainable debt build-ups. Despite progress in the overall debt situation, it has been found that only a 
small percentage of the HIPC programmes have speciﬁ  cally considered the costs for achieving the MDGs 
(United Nations, 2006c). Even in those countries where costing has been done, the resulting resources made 
available from debt relief are not enough to achieve the MDGs by 2015 (United Nations, 2006d). In addi-
tion, scaled-up aid with external debt relief does not preclude increasing public indebtedness as some recent 
evidence shows (e.g., Gupta, Powell and Yang, 2006). Th   is may particularly be the case if monetary authori-
ties are concerned with the liquidity impact of increases in aid-induced spending and try to sterilize through 
the sale of government securities or central bank sterilization loans. Th   is may reduce the potential inﬂ  ation-
ary impact of aid-ﬁ  nanced public spending, but at the same time it will raise domestic debt accumulation, 
which may increase domestic interest rates and crowd out domestic credit supplies to private investors. With 
poorly developed domestic ﬁ  nancial sectors and shallow capital and securities markets, this may further 
induce strong interest rate volatility with additional negative repercussions for investment demand, as oc-
curred, for instance, in Uganda (Gupta, Powell and Yang, 2006).
Such issues may be even more relevant in the case of middle-income countries. Th   ese are typically 
not eligible for external debt relief, except perhaps in times of crisis, and must rely more on market-based 
instruments. Most developing countries have local currency bond markets to varying degrees of depth, 
liquidity and type of instrument. However, many tend to have rather poorly developed markets for long-
term government and corporate bonds denominated in local currency. Th   e lack of a domestic bond market 
makes it more diﬃ   cult to ﬁ  nance long-term public infrastructure investments and major private moderniza-
tion projects (see United Nations, 2006b). It also forces ﬁ  rms to use short-term debt to ﬁ  nance long-term 
investment, thereby accumulating maturity mismatches in their balance sheets, or to borrow abroad, lead-
ing to currency mismatches. Th   e mix of such maturity and currency mismatches enhances the fragility of 
the ﬁ  nancial system during periods of exchange-rate depreciation and rising interest rates. Th  e  insuﬃ   cient 
development of the domestic bond market and the associated risk of ﬁ  nancial fragility reduce in turn the 
policy space for monetary intervention when dealing with external shocks. A poorly developed bond market 
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ernment demand for domestic ﬁ  nancing of its deﬁ  cits may have rather strong upward eﬀ  ects on domestic 
interest rates. Under such circumstances, heavy reliance on domestic borrowing to ﬁ  nance the MDG strategy 
could lead to a quickly rising domestic debt-service burden. Rising interest rates will also increase the cost of 
borrowing for private investors and hence domestically ﬁ  nanced MDG investments could crowd out private 
investments and lower economic growth.
Th   e importance of the development of domestic bond markets was also made evident by the Asian 
crisis and led to a stronger focus of ﬁ  nancial policies on this issue. As a result, domestic bond markets have 
grown rapidly since the late 1990s, not only in Asia, Latin America and the emerging market economies 
in Europe, but – to a lesser extent – also in Africa (see Ocampo and Griﬃ   th-Jones, 2006; United Nations, 
2006b; Ocampo and Vos, 2006). Where such markets have been made to function, governments will have 
greater scope for domestic resource mobilization for the MDGs through the bond market along with a lower 
risk of crowding out private investment. Th   e risks associated with rapid domestic government indebtedness 
may still exist and intertemporal trade-oﬀ  s need to be assessed with caution, that is to say, governments will 
have to assess their debt sustainability. Th   is will depend mainly on the extent to which the MDG-related 
investments will translate in a timely manner into economic returns (through productivity increases, crowd-
ing-in of private investments) to the extent that economic growth and sustained low interest rates will ensure 
a ﬁ  scally sustainable ﬁ  nancing strategy.
Labour market constraints
For low-income countries, large-scale investments for the achievement of the MDGs could meet severe 
skilled labour constraints in the short-to-medium run. Public expenditures centred on meeting the MDGs 
in the form of expanding basic social services in health and education will put high pressure on a pool of 
teachers, doctors and other trained workers that is likely to be limited. Constraints on skilled labour could 
then lead to upward pressure on the skill premium for such workers which in turn would increase the overall 
labour costs for the public sector and the cost for achieving the MDGs. Bourguignon and Sundberg (2006) 
suggests that for reasons such as these a sequenced approach to expanding MDG-related social services may 
be needed in order to avoid disruptive pressures on labour costs owing to skill bottlenecks. Investing in spe-
cialized education and training for teachers and medical personnel should then precede or move in parallel 
with the expansion of the services themselves.
In middle-income countries, such constraints may also exist but are likely to be less severe as these 
countries tend to have higher initial average educational levels.5 Trying to achieve the MDGs may induce 
other labour-market constraints over time, however. As the MDG target (and beyond) for education is 
achieved, the supply of skilled workers in the labour market will increase. If the economy’s structure does 
not adjust commensurately to absorb the increased supply of better-educated workers, the skill premium will 
likely fall. While this, in turn, may lower the cost of achieving the MDGs, it will also likely provide a dis-
incentive to invest in education. Most empirical studies of the determinants of access to education indicate 
that expected private returns to education are by far not the sole factor, but an important one nonetheless 
(Glewwe, 2002). Hence, insuﬃ   cient creation of skilled jobs in the economy could jeopardize the achieve-
ment of the education MDG. Th   is could induce additional eﬀ  orts by the government to stimulate school 
5  As noted in one of the examples given above, some countries may already have suﬃ   cient availability of human 
resources, as may be derived, for instance, from the low pupil-teacher ratio and high teacher absenteeism in Ecuador 
(Vos and Ponce 2004) or from a high concentration of medical personnel in major cities at the expense of lower 
availability in rural areas (e.g., Vos and others, 2004), implying that the problem may be more the quality of personnel 
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attendance, but in such a case, the real problem would be how to improve the environment for stimulating 
a structural change in the economy towards technologies and activities that can absorb larger amounts of 
skilled labour.
Th   e way the indicated trade-oﬀ  s present themselves will depend further on the functioning of the la-
bour market, that is to say, the degree of labour-market segmentation and ﬂ  exibility in real wage adjustment. 
Labour markets in developing countries are typically segmented owing to many factors that would not allow 
some workers to ﬁ  nd a job in some sectors. High barriers to entry into MDG-related sectors may prevent the 
real wage from adjusting ﬂ  exibly. For example, skill requirements may be very high in some MDG-related 
sectors, particularly in activities that should be relatively advanced from a technological point of view, for ex-
ample, hospital attention. Th   is may prevent certain types of workers with a higher education but who do not 
possess the required skills from having full access to jobs in MDG-related sectors. If skilled, but not highly-
skilled, workers end up seeking employment in non-MDG-related sectors, the real wage in these sectors will 
likely fall. Should the real wage adjustment be insuﬃ   cient to clear the labour market, unemployment and, 
most likely, underemployment will emerge, resulting in negative repercussions in terms of rising income 
inequality and poverty. 
In conclusion, reducing the aforementioned constraints – that is to say, by creating policy space 
in order to be able to execute countercyclical policies; shifting the objective of macroeconomic policies to 
a broader deﬁ  nition of stability and making full employment the primary objective; creating ﬁ  scal space 
through increased taxation; achieving greater eﬃ   ciency in social expenditures; and reaching debt sustainabil-
ity with competitive exchange rates – should in theory help mobilize domestic resources and enable countries 
to close in on the MDGs. As these factors tend to present themselves diﬀ  erently across countries, we need 
empirical tools to help us gauge the economy-wide implications of each of these trade-oﬀ  s and the achieve-
ment of the MDGs in any given context.
An economy-wide framework to analyze feasible 
ﬁ  nancing strategies for achieving the MDGs
Many of the issues discussed in the previous section require an economy-wide framework to examine the 
capacity and ﬁ  nancing constraints to achieving the MDGs and the trade-oﬀ  s with other economic policy 
goals. Th   e existence of such interaction eﬀ  ects is the rationale for the use of a computable general equilib-
rium (CGE) model. Th   e pursuit of a strategy towards the achievement of the MDGs will likely have strong 
eﬀ  ects throughout the economy. It will surely aﬀ  ect the demand and supply for diﬀ  erent types of goods 
and services, for labour and capital, and for foreign exchange, and the related adjustments may imply both 
trade-oﬀ  s and synergies throughout the achievement of the MDGs. Th   ese feedback eﬀ  ects may substan-
tially alter the outcomes of studies that focus on sector analysis, such as the needs for and cost implica-
tions of separately pursuing the goals for education, health and so on. In addition, the general equilibrium 
framework, as depicted, also takes into consideration the possible synergies between the diﬀ  erent MDGs. 
Such synergies may inﬂ  uence the required expansion of services (e.g., greater coverage of drinking water 
supply may reduce the need for health-service expansion) or the speed at which the various MDGs can be 
achieved.12  DESA Working Paper No. 36
Th   e outcomes will also depend to an important extent on the way in which the strategy is ﬁ  nanced. 
Foreign ﬁ  nancing may induce RER eﬀ  ects of the type discussed above, while ﬁ  nancing through domestic 
taxes could reduce private consumption demand, among other things, or domestic borrowing could crowd 
out credit resources for private investment. Policy makers thus may face important trade-oﬀ  s. No doubt 
increased public spending is essential for achieving the MDGs, but adjustments in the RER, real wages and 
other relative prices may increase the unit costs for achieving the MDGs along with the costs for other sec-
tors, or discourage exports and thereby enhance the need for foreign ﬁ  nancing, and so on. Th  e  productivity 
gains which improved MDG achievement may generate will likely be attained with a time lag and thus have 
little impact on growth in the short and medium term. Th   erefore, it is critical that the short-run trade-oﬀ  s 
do not oﬀ  set potential economic and social gains.
Dynamic CGE models for the simulation of policies aimed at human development goals have been 
developed before in studies of the 1970s and 1980s, especially in those providing analytical depth to the 
so-called basic needs approach to development (see, e.g., Kouwenaar, 1986; Hopkins and van der Hoeven, 
1982). At the time, such exercises were very time consuming and costly because of data limitations and 
computational requirements. However, the shift away from concerns about employment, income distribu-
tion and poverty to macroeconomic stability and structural adjustment in mainstream development policies 
also de-emphasized the need for such modelling eﬀ  orts. More recently, work undertaken at the World Bank 
has revived the approach in the context of the ongoing debate about scaling up resources to achieve the 
MDGs. Th   is framework has been labelled MAMS (Maquette for MDG Simulation) as originally presented 
in Löfgren (2004) and Bourguignon and others (2004). Th   e framework was originally designed to deal in 
particular with low-income country contexts and the trade-oﬀ  s associated with the scaling-up of aid inﬂ  ows 
for MDG-related expenditures. In an ongoing joint project coordinated by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), UN/DESA and the World Bank, this framework has been extended and applied in 19 
Latin American countries. See Löfgren and Diaz-Bonilla (2006) for a revised version of MAMS incorporat-
ing the feedback from this experience.
Th   e MAMS framework has been built from a fairly standard CGE framework with dynamic-recur-
sive features but incorporates a special module which speciﬁ  es the main determinants of MDG achievement 
and the direct impact of enhanced public expenditures on MDG-related infrastructure and services. MAMS 
considers the MDGs for poverty reduction (MDG 1), achieving universal primary education (MDG 2), re-
ducing under-ﬁ  ve and maternal mortality (MDGs 4 and 5) and increasing access to safe water and basic san-
itation (MDG 7). In the case of MDG 2, the demand for primary and other levels of schooling is a function 
of student behaviour (enrolment, repetition, graduation). Student behaviour, in turn, depends on the quality 
of education (identiﬁ  ed by variables such as classroom availability and student-teacher ratios), the income 
incentives (the expected wage premium from education), the under-ﬁ  ve mortality rate (a proxy for the health 
status of the student population), household consumption per capita (capacity to pay for education and 
opportunity costs) and the level of public infrastructure (a proxy for the eﬀ  ective distance to school). Un-
der-ﬁ  ve and maternal mortality (MDGs 4 and 5) are seen to be determined by the availability of public and 
private health services, household consumption per capita, the level of public infrastructure (a proxy for the 
eﬀ  ective distance to health centres and hospitals), and the coverage of water and sanitation services. Access to 
water and sanitation (MDG 7) are modelled as a function of household consumption per capita, the provi-
sion of such services by public or private providers and the level of public infrastructure. Th   e income poverty 
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production, employment, wages and other relative prices, as well as changes in the quality of human capital 
through MDG-related expenditures.6
Th   e model includes a rather detailed speciﬁ  cation of social services related to the MDGs, spell-
ing out diﬀ  erent levels of education, diﬀ  erent health sectors, sectors for drinking water and sanitation and 
other public infrastructure. In the model speciﬁ  cations, these services may be provided publicly or privately. 
Nonetheless, it is only new government investment and current expenditures that will lead to a policy-driven 
increase in the supply of MDG-related services and public infrastructure (see ﬁ  gure 1). For this to happen, 
the government is assumed to resort to suﬃ   cient ﬁ  nancing for the new investment mobilized either domesti-
cally or from abroad.
Figure 1.
MDG achievement and economy-wide effects in MAMS
6 Th  e  ﬁ  nal outcome for income poverty (MDG 1) can be estimated by looking at the outcomes for per capita household 
income and consumption for diﬀ  erent household groups. However, CGE models can typically only specify a limited 
number of representative households, which results in insuﬃ   cient detail regarding changes in the distribution to 
be able to make robust statements regarding the poverty outcomes. In consequence, the CGE analysis needs to 
be supplemented by certain assumptions (such as ﬁ  xed within group distributions) or, as has been done for the 
empirical analysis reported here, by a method of microsimulations, which takes the labour market outcomes (relative 
remunerations, employment, changes in skill level) from the CGE for diﬀ  erent types of workers and applies them to 
a micro data set (such as a household survey) to obtain the required details about income distribution for the poverty 
analysis. See Bourguignon and others (2002) and Vos and others (2006) for a discussion and application of such 
methods in conjunction with CGE model analysis.
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Achievements in education involve the enlargement of school infrastructure and a higher premium 
wage for better-educated workers. Th   e greater the availability of public infrastructure, including that in 
MDG-related sectors other than education, the larger the capital stock, leaving room for factor productivity 
growth in the model (see ﬁ  gure 1).7 Th   e quality of the stock of labour will improve over time as more better-
educated prospective workers leave the schooling system. Th   is will further enhance productivity growth with 
subsequent wage- and income-distribution eﬀ  ects. Growth can be encouraged as a result of the productivity 
gains; this has the potential to lead to economy-wide eﬀ  ects which in turn will aﬀ  ect MDG achievement 
(see ﬁ  gure 1). Achievements in drinking water and sanitation supply also help to improve health conditions, 
and in turn improved health status may impact positively on education outcomes along with other determi-
nants. Per capita household consumption responds positively to the government’s increasing the supply of 
MDG-related services and this may have further favourable implications for MDG achievement. Since this 
is an economy-wide model, per capita household consumption can also change as a result of relative price 
changes. All domestic income changes aﬀ  ect the economy’s capacity to generate savings. Th  e  macroeconomic 
viability of ﬁ  nancing the new MDG sector investment will depend on the macroeconomic constraints of the 
country, the initial debt burden, the source of ﬁ  nancing, and the productivity of public investments towards 
the MDGs, among other factors. 
Domestic resource mobilization for MDG achievement: country applications
As indicated, the MAMS framework is being applied in 19 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in 
an ongoing joint project coordinated by UNDP, UN/DESA and the World Bank. Here, we focus on some of 
the simulation results of that project that are derived from the applications of Costa Rica and Ecuador. Th  ese 
are two middle-income countries with large diﬀ  erences in terms of initial levels of MDG achievement. On 
the one hand, Costa Rica achieved the MDGs in the areas of access to water and sanitation and extreme pov-
erty before 2000; however, the country experienced a setback in extreme poverty thereafter, but the problem 
aﬀ  ects no more than 2.8 per cent of the population living on less than $1 per day. Th   e country is also evolv-
ing quite satisfactorily towards the achievement of the other MDGs (Sánchez, 2006). Costa Rica’s indicators 
for under-ﬁ  ve and maternal mortality are already among the lowest in Latin America. Even though Costa 
Rica is close to achieving the MDGs, to such an extent that the additional resource requirements to reach 
them are likely to be relatively low, macroeconomic trade-oﬀ  s will likely need to be considered. On the other 
hand, in contrast, Ecuador faces bigger challenges in meeting the goals. In fact, under the current growth 
outlook and with existing policies, this country is oﬀ   track for reaching all the goals, except for MDGs 4 
and 5. Extreme poverty stood at about 15 per cent by 2000, and not even tripling the historical average per 
capita income growth rate (to 3 per cent per annum) would be suﬃ   cient to achieve MDG 1 by 2015 (León, 
Rosero and Vos, 2006). Th   e high income inequality in the country severely limits the trickling down of eco-
nomic growth to the poor. Either much faster growth or a radical income redistribution programme would 
be needed to achieve that target. Net enrolment and completion rates in primary education reached 90 and 
67 per cent, respectively, in 1990. Th   ere was little progress during the 1990s, but after the major economic 
crisis of 1999 several social programmes targeted towards the poor were boosted, including a cash-transfer 
programme conditioned to school attendance. Th  ese  eﬀ  orts helped to increase net primary enrolment to 95 
per cent and the completion rate to 82.7 per cent by 2005. Progress has been more continuous in health, as 
under-ﬁ  ve mortality fell from 43.0 to 20.7 per 1,000 live births in the same period and the scarce available 
data suggest that maternal mortality fell from 117 to 67 per 100,000 live births between 1990 and 2002. 
7  A productivity parameter for each MDG-related sector can also allow the simulation of eﬃ   ciency 
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With continued (linear) trends, both health MDGs would be within reach by 2015. Coverage of drinking 
water supply and sanitation are still far oﬀ   target, as 21 per cent of the population is without access to drink-
ing water and 50 per cent without access to adequate sewerage systems. 
In order to analyse the trade-oﬀ  s associated with alternative ﬁ  nancing strategies to reach the MDGs, 
we ﬁ  rst deﬁ  ne a baseline or “business-as-usual” (BAU) scenario. Th   e BAU essentially identiﬁ  es the economic 
trajectory from the base year to 2015, assuming that MDG-related government spending continues to grow 
at past trends and all other policy variables remain unchanged. Th   e base-year solution of MAMS is calibrated 
using data and parameters deﬁ  ning the economic structure and key behavioural relationships. Most of the 
data and parameters are estimated using a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). Key elasticities, in particular 
those that deﬁ  ne the behaviour related to the achievement of the MDGs, have been derived from micro-
econometric analyses speciﬁ  c to each country. In the dynamic solution of the model, the size of the popula-
tion and the composition of the labour force is updated recursively according to given growth rates and the 
degree of MDG achievement. 
Subsequently, we run a number of “MDG scenarios” under alternative ﬁ  nancing strategies in order 
to simulate a situation where all MDGs will be achieved in a timely manner, except that of poverty (MDG 
1), which is seen to depend on the economic interaction eﬀ  ects taking place over time, as indicated earlier. 
For the MDGs in education, health, and water and sanitation, the model calculates the cost of achieving the 
targets given the existing shortfalls, the cost structure (and endogenous changes in relative prices) of provid-
ing MDG-related services, and household demand for these services. Th   e cost requirements are estimated 
according to the ﬁ  nancing strategy for which the model is solved. For instance, outcomes for relative prices 
(including real wages and the RER) may diﬀ  er depending on whether the strategy is ﬁ  nanced through 
increased taxes, domestic borrowing or foreign loans; this in turn may imply diﬀ  erent impacts on unit costs 
for providing the MDG services. To determine the main trade-oﬀ  s in mobilizing resources from diﬀ  erent 
sources to achieve the MDGs, the results of the BAU are compared with those of the MDG scenarios.8 We 
will discuss the results for the two country cases separately.
Costa Rica
As the targets for water and sanitation (MDG 7) had already been reached in Costa Rica by 2000, this mil-
lennium goal is not considered in the model simulations. BAU appears to be relatively adequate with regard 
to the goal for increasing the primary school completion rate and reducing under-ﬁ  ve mortality. Th  e  related 
targets will be close to achievement in 2015 under the BAU scenario (see table 1). Th   ere will also be a con-
siderable reduction in maternal mortality. Consequently, the extra costs of the aforementioned three MDG 
8  Several other scenarios not discussed here were also generated, including a situation in which each 
MDG is achieved separately next to that in which MDGs 2, 4, 5 and 7 are all achieved at the same time. 
Comparing these situations allows us to study possible synergies and trade-oﬀ  s between trying to achieve 
all MDGs simultaneously or in a sequenced manner. Further, assumptions about macroeconomic closure 
rules are important when analysing CGE simulation results. Th   e MAMS speciﬁ  cation used for the present 
analysis allows for unemployment and hence imperfect wage adjustment in the diﬀ  erent labour-market 
segments. Th   e real exchange rate adjusts ﬂ  exibly to generate just the amount of foreign savings that 
would clear any emerging imbalance of the current account with the rest of the world, assuming all other 
components of the capital account of the balance of payments remain ﬁ  xed. Adjustment of the government 
balance depends on which ﬁ  nancing strategy is adopted. In the case of tax ﬁ  nancing, direct tax rates are 
increased endogenously so as to mobilize the resources for the additional public expenditures, while with 
regard to domestic borrowing direct tax rates stay ﬁ  xed and the ensuing government deﬁ  cit is ﬁ  nanced 
through government-bond emissions. Aggregate investment is assumed to be savings-constrained in the 
model simulations reported here.16  DESA Working Paper No. 36
scenarios are not expected to be very large, although the degree of extreme poverty reduction is insuﬃ   cient 
to meet the target.
In order to achieve MDGs 2, 4 and 5, ﬁ  nal government consumption will have to increase by 1 
percentage point of GDP per year over and above the level of spending of the BAU scenario. Public invest-
ment in education and health services will have to increase by , respectively, 0.3 and 0.8 percentage points of 
GDP per year compared to the BAU scenario (see table 2). Th   ese additional cost estimates are more or less 
the same under all ﬁ  nancing scenarios; they are only slightly lower when the additional government spending 
is ﬁ  nanced through foreign borrowing.
Dutch disease eﬀ  ects are visible both in the BAU and in the MDG scenarios. Th   e baseline trend is 
already towards larger spending on non-tradables. Th   ere is some erosion of export competitiveness because 
the tendency towards RER appreciation is not fully corrected by Costa Rica’s managed ﬂ  oating exchange-
rate regime. In view of the country’s MDG achievements, the degree of RER appreciation is not very strong 
(about 4 per cent for the whole period). Th   e appreciation eﬀ  ect is initially stronger when the MDG strategy 
is ﬁ  nanced through external borrowing (see ﬁ  gure 2). 
Table 1.
Costa Rica: MDG achievement in the BAU scenario
2002 2005 2010 2015 Target
MDG 1: Extreme povertya (%) 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.5 1.7
MDG 2: Primary school completion rate (%) 88.9 90.5 94.9 99.1 100.0
MDG 4: Child mortality (per 1,000 live births) 9.6 9.1 8.1 7.0 6.0
MDG 5: Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births)b 41.0 37.9 31.7 25.4  20.0
MDG 7: Drinking water supply coverage (%) 78.4 78.7 79.4 80.5 79.6
MDG 7: Sanitation coverage (%) 93.4 93.4 93.5 93.5 93.5
Source: Sánchez (2006), based on the MAMS model for Costa Rica.
a Poverty results are estimated after running a microsimulation methodology (see footnote 6). 
b A less ambitious national target for maternal mortality is used as justiﬁ  ed in Sánchez (2006). Th   e international MDG target for 
maternal mortality would be 8.3 deaths per 100,000 live births.
Table 2.
Costa Rica: Simulated additional costs of achieving the MDGs separately or jointly in 2002-2015
Percentage of GDPa
Baseline spending
Average annual extra costs
(targeting MDGs separately and jointly)
Only MDGs Only MDGs 4 & 5 Only MDG 7 All MDGs
Primary education 2.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3
- Current spending 2.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2
- Investment 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Health 4.1 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.8
- Current spending 3.9 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6
- Investment 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
Water and sanitation 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Total 7.3 0.4 0.8 0.1 1.1
Source: Sánchez (2006), based on the MAMS model for Costa Rica.
a Th   e additional costs are for the foreign ﬁ  nancing scenario and are measured as percentage deviations with respect to the BAU 
scenario. Th   ey only increase marginally when there is mobilization of domestic resources to ﬁ  nance the new public investment.Constraints to achieving the MDGs through domestic resource mobilization  17
Figure 2.
Costa Rica: Real exchange-rate appreciation under
the BAU and alternative MDG ﬁ  nancing scenarios
(Index, 2002=100)
Th   e alternative forms of resource mobilization have a greater eﬀ  ect on private investment. Speciﬁ  -
cally, the model simulations suggest a strong crowding-out eﬀ  ect if the government resorts to bond ﬁ  nancing 
(see ﬁ  gure 3). With greater government demand for private savings, less domestic credit becomes available 
for private investors and investment levels increase at a considerably slower pace under this ﬁ  nancing sce-
nario compared to the BAU or the other two MDG scenarios. In the case of tax ﬁ  nancing, there is also some 
crowding-out of private investment, albeit only slight.
Figure 3. 
Costa Rica: Private investment in the BAU and alternative MDG ﬁ  nancing scenarios
(Values in local currency at constant prices) 
Both the RER appreciation and the impact on private investment aﬀ  ect export supply. Exports rep-
resent more than 40 per cent of GDP in Costa Rica and are the engine of growth (see Sánchez and Sauma, 
2006). As shown by Sánchez (2004), Costa Rican exports are highly sensitive to exchange-rate adjustments as 
well as to domestic credit supplies and investment in export activities. Consequently, as depicted in ﬁ  gure 4, 
the stronger the crowding-out and the RER appreciation eﬀ  ects, the slower the export growth becomes. In 
the same vein, GDP growth is slightly slower under the domestic ﬁ  nancing scenario (see ﬁ  gure 5).
Source: Sánchez (2006), based on the 
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Figure 4.
Costa Rica: Exports in the BAU and alternative MDG ﬁ  nancing scenarios
(Values in local currency at constant prices)
Figure 5. 
Costa Rica: Real GDP in the BAU and alternative MDG ﬁ  nancing scenarios 
(Values in local currency at constant prices)
Except for the domestic ﬁ  nancing scenario, the alternative ﬁ  nancing mechanisms generally have a 
similar impact on employment and wage trends. Over time, improvements in education lead to increased 
supplies of semi-skilled and skilled workers. Th   is is also the case under the BAU scenario. Th  e  composition 
of labour demand does not change commensurately; hence, each of the scenarios shows rising real labour 
incomes for unskilled workers (who start running in short supply) and the wage premium for better-edu-
cated workers falls. Both the rise in average real wages and the drop in wage inequality help reduce extreme 
income poverty, yet not to a suﬃ   cient enough degree as to achieve MDG 1 (see ﬁ  gure 6). Th   e MDG scenar-
ios, however, do not improve the degree of poverty reduction; this is mainly due to the loss of export growth 
associated with the RER appreciation, the crowding-out of private investment under the domestic borrowing 
scenario, and the initial loss of disposable household income due to increased tax rates under the tax-ﬁ  nanc-
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Source: Sánchez (2006), based on the 
MAMS model for Costa Rica.Constraints to achieving the MDGs through domestic resource mobilization  19
extreme poverty rates, could suggest that a mixed ﬁ  nancing strategy might be better if only to avoid some 
of the related trade-oﬀ  s. Th  e  tax-ﬁ  nancing scenario shows a negative impact on poverty reduction early on 
in the strategy, while the foreign-ﬁ  nancing scenario creates stronger RER appreciation with negative overall 
employment eﬀ  ects originating from the export sector around 2010. A crowding-out of private investment 
starts to hurt poverty reduction at a later stage.
Fiscal sustainability of the MDG strategy seems best preserved when recurring to tax ﬁ  nancing.9 
Direct tax income would increase by 1.6 percentage points of GDP relative to the BAU scenario. Th  e  budget 
deﬁ  cit would not increase, and domestic and external debt-to-GDP ratios would stay at current levels, which 
are considered sustainable at about 28 and 21 per cent of GDP, respectively. Financing of the MDG strategy 
through domestic borrowing would lead to rising ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits and a sharply rising domestic debt burden 
to possibly unsustainable levels. Th   e domestic debt-to-GDP ratio would nearly double between 2002 and 
2015: from 38.2 to 66.9 per cent (see ﬁ  gure 7). In recent history, the country’s domestic government debt 
has never risen over 40 per cent of GDP. On the other hand, foreign ﬁ  nancing of the MDG strategy would 
lead to a substantial increase in foreign debt, though likely staying below critical levels, as it would increase 
to 33 per cent of GDP in 2015, up from 19.5 per cent in 2002 (see ﬁ  gure 8). 
In summary, there is a noticeable trade-oﬀ   between the achievement of MDG 1 and the other 
MDGs under the domestic resource mobilization scenarios. In the case of tax ﬁ  nancing, the government 
should avoid tax increases from falling on the poor, or compensate the poor through other income support 
measures, especially in the early years of the strategy. Bond ﬁ  nancing clearly seems to be the lesser option for 
Costa Rica, where, in fact, the critical domestic-debt and ﬁ  scal situation are already a main concern to macr-
oeconomic policy makers. Recurring to external borrowing could alleviate such a constraint, but this may be 
accompanied with possible dangers of strongly rising currency mismatches between liabilities and assets held 
by domestic investors. More foreign borrowing could also exacerbate the trend towards exchange-rate ap-
preciation. For all ﬁ  nancing strategies it seems to hold that the government should try to avoid further RER 
9  In Costa Rica, total tax revenues only represented 13 per cent of GDP per year on average during 2000-
2005.
Figure 6. 
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target
Source: Sánchez (2006), based on the 
MAMS model for Costa Rica.
a Th   e incidence of extreme poverty 
is deﬁ  ned as the share of the total 
population living on less than 1$ a day. 
Calculations are based on labour-market 
outcomes for diﬀ  erent types of workers 
as estimated in the MAMS model 
and after applying a microsimulation 
methodology (see footnote 6).20  DESA Working Paper No. 36
appreciation. It is not very likely that the recently introduced managed ﬂ  oating system allowing the colón 
to ﬂ  uctuate within a pre-established band will actually avoid this, unless the band is deﬁ  ned in such a way 
as to keep the exchange rate competitive. MDG investments in education and other investments in public 
infrastructure may strengthen the competitiveness of export sectors through productivity increases over time 
and compensate for the exchange-rate appreciation. While the MAMS model considers the eﬀ  ects of educa-
tion and infrastructure improvements on productivity, it is possible that these eﬀ  ects are underestimated in 
the present scenario. First, there is little empirical evidence for Costa Rica regarding the quantitative impact 
of these factors on productivity growth and, second, the current scenarios do not take into consideration ad-
ditional investments in physical infrastructure, such as roads, ports, irrigation systems and so on.
Figure 7. 
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Source: Sánchez (2006), based on the 
MAMS model for Costa Rica.
Figure 8. 
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Ecuador
Further progress in achieving the development goals is expected under the BAU scenario for Ecuador albeit 
not suﬃ   cient to meet the MDG targets by 2015 (see table 3). Th   e continuation of the education policies ini-
tiated in the ﬁ  rst few years of the new century would bring primary school completion rates to 95 per cent, 
just short of the target. Health outcomes would also fall short of the targets for MDGs 4 and 5 by a slight 
margin, implying that the BAU does not fully “reproduce” unchanged trends by which the target could be 
reached, as discussed above. Th   e related assumptions for the BAU are considered reasonable as the impact of 
policies and other health determinants tends to be non-linear. Moreover, as mortality rates drop, relatively 
greater eﬀ  orts are needed as the prevalence of more complicated causes of death tends to increase. Th  e  targets 
for water and, particularly, sanitation would fall short by a somewhat wider margin. Th   e target for the reduc-
tion of extreme poverty (MDG 1) would not be reached either under the baseline scenario, as also predicted 
by the partial equilibrium analyses discussed above.
Th   e model simulations suggest that the required additional costs of achieving the MDGs would 
reach between 2.5 and 2.8 percentage points of GDP by the end of the simulation period (2015), depending 
on the ﬁ  nancing scenario. Th   e scenarios for domestic resource mobilization are somewhat more costly as a 
share of GDP than the foreign borrowing scenario. Th   e estimated extra costs increase towards the end of the 
period. Th   is is so in part because with greater MDG achievement more children will be in school and more 
children and mothers will be using health services. Th   e cost also increase, especially in health care, because 
the MAMS model assumes diminishing returns to MDG investments, that is as one gets closer to the target, 
it takes a bigger eﬀ  ort to get also the last children in school and further reduce infant mortality. Th  e  average 
additional costs per year for the full period 2001-2015 therefore are lower (see table 4).10 Public expenditures 
for primary education would nearly have to be doubled from 1.1 to 1.8 per cent of GDP, while health expen-
ditures would need to increase by no more than 0.3 percentage points to 2.3 of GDP per year on average for 
the period. Extra investments in water and sanitation infrastructure would incur an additional 0.3 per cent of 
GDP. To achieve all MDGs simultaneously, the Government would have to spend between 1.3 and 1.5 per 
cent more per annum than under the BAU.11 Table 3 shows further that for primary education and infant and 
maternal mortality, achieving all the MDGs simultaneously is cheaper than the sum of the costs if, hypotheti-
cally, the MDGs were to be pursued separately. Th   e savings are derived particularly from health costs. Th  is 
10  In the case of Costa Rica MDG costs do not rise towards the end of the simulation period as it is already quite close to 
achieving the MDGs from the base year and in the simulations it manages to achieve most already by 2011.
11 Th   e costs are slightly higher as a percentage of GDP under the increased taxation or domestic borrowing scenarios than 
under the foreign borrowing scenario.
Table 3. 
Ecuador: MDG achievement in the BAU scenario
2001 2005 2010 2015 Target
MDG 1, Extreme povertya (%) 17.0 13.7 10.4 9.4 7.7
MDG 2, Primary school completion rate (%) 76.4 82.7 91.4 95.4 100.0
MDG 4, Child mortality (per 1,000 live births)  23.5 20.7 17.6 15.7 14.3
MDG 5, Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births) 87.3 67.2 46.6 36.0 29.3
MDG 7, Drinking water supply coverage (%) 77.6 79.1 81.6 83.6 89.0
MDG 7, Sanitation coverage (%) 46.3 50.0 56.0 60.9 73.0
Source: León, Rosero and Vos (2006), based on the MAMS model for Ecuador.
a Poverty results are estimated after running a microsimulation methodology (see footnote 6).22  DESA Working Paper No. 36
result is driven by the synergies between the MDGs (achieving the education goal, for instance, helps achieve 
the health target faster) as well as by economy-wide eﬀ  ects (for instance, the reduction in wage costs as the 
wage premium for higher-educated workers falls with better education outcomes). Such synergies are typically 
not considered in other cost projections of education and health goals. In the Costa Rican case, similar syner-
gies are less important (see table 2), because the country has already a high degree of MDG achievement in 
the baseline. Th   us, for instance, only small gains are needed to achieve the child mortality target and hence its 
achievement will also have only a small spill-over eﬀ  ect on achievement of the education target.
Table 4. Th   e simulated cost estimates do not take into consideration other eﬃ   ciency gains which 
could be obtained by making budget allocations more cost eﬀ  ective or by trying to improve the eﬃ   ciency in 
the delivery of services. As mentioned above, Vos and Ponce (2004) found in the case of education expendi-
tures that by reducing the number of redundant teachers whilst enhancing the quality of other educational 
inputs, the MDG target might be reached at virtually no additional costs; however, the required measures 
(ﬁ  ring a considerable number of teachers) for such a low-cost scenario will likely be politically diﬃ   cult to 
implement. Th   e outcomes discussed below do not consider all such options of creating ﬁ  scal space through 
eﬃ   ciency gains of this kind.
As in the case of Costa Rica, Ecuador’s RER would appreciate in each of the scenarios, including 
the baseline, given the rise in non-tradable expenditures. Th   e degree of appreciation is strongest, as expected, 
under the scenario involving foreign borrowing to ﬁ  nance the additional MDG expenditures (see ﬁ  gure 9). 
Th   is will erode competitiveness of exports (see ﬁ  gure 10), particularly non-traditional exports, thereby fur-
ther increasing the country’s reliance on oil and other, mainly agricultural, primary commodities. Th  e  model 
simulations suggest further that in the given timeframe until 2015, the productivity gains of achieving the 
MDGs by themselves are not suﬃ   cient to stimulate export production with higher technology content.
Th   e scenario involving increased government borrowing to ﬁ  nance the MDGs, as in the case of 
Costa Rica, would slow the increase in private investment demand owing to the crowding-out eﬀ  ect of credit 
available to the private sector (see ﬁ  gure 11). Th  is  eﬀ  ect by itself also implies in Ecuador’s case that the trade-
oﬀ   between GDP growth and MDG achievement is largest in the scenario involving domestic borrowing. 
Th  is  trade-oﬀ   is, however, only mild as can be seen from ﬁ  gure 12.
Table 4. 
Ecuador: Simulated additional costs of achieving the MDGs separately or jointly in 2001-2015
Percentage of GDPa
Baseline spending
Average annual extra costs
(targeting MDGs separately and jointly)
Only MDG 2 Only MDGs 4&5 Only MDG 7 All MDGs
Primary education 1.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.7
- Current spending 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.6
- Investment 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Health 2.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.3
- Current spending 1.6 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1
- Investment 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2
Water and sanitation 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3
Total 3.4 0.8 0.6 0.3 1.3
Source: León, Rosero and Vos (2006), based on the MAMS model for Ecuador.
a Th   e additional costs are for the foreign ﬁ  nancing scenario and are measured as percentage deviations with respect to the BAU 
scenario. Th   ey only increase marginally when there is mobilization of domestic resources to ﬁ  nance the new public investment.Constraints to achieving the MDGs through domestic resource mobilization  23
Labour-market outcomes are by and large similar across the ﬁ  nancing scenarios, except that with the 
stronger real appreciation under the external-ﬁ  nancing scenario, the average real wage increase is somewhat 
greater, allowing for a stronger impact on poverty. Th   e supply of skilled workers outpaces demand in each of 
the scenarios, producing a drop in the wage premium for this category of workers. Unskilled workers gain 
the most from the MDG strategy, as they would see real labour incomes expand at 4.0 per cent per annum. 
Th   is, unlike in the Costa Rican case, would lead to a substantial redistribution of income, lowering income 
inequality by more than 10 per cent (as measured through the Gini coeﬃ   cient of per capita household 
incomes). Th   is, in combination with the moderate growth of income per capita of about 2 per cent per an-
num, would result in remarkable poverty reduction, but insuﬃ   cient to reach the MDG-1 target by 2015 in 
any of the ﬁ  nancing scenarios (see ﬁ  gure 13).
Figure 9.
Ecuador: Real exchange-rate appreciation in the BAU and alternative MDG ﬁ  nancing scenarios 
(Index, 2002=100)
Source: León, Rosero and Vos (2006), 
based on the MAMS model for Ecuador.
Figure 10. 
Ecuador: Export volume in the BAU and alternative MDG ﬁ  nancing scenarios 
(Values in millions of local currency at constant prices)
Source: León, Rosero and Vos (2006), 
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Hence, as in Costa Rica, the growth path associated with achieving MDGs 4, 5 and 7 does not gen-
erate enough jobs or labour income improvements to achieve MDG 1 simultaneously. Th   e domestic borrow-
ing scenario appears to be the least favourable for reducing poverty, essentially because of the crowing-out 
eﬀ  ect on investment and growth. Th   is scenario would furthermore seem less attractive because of the strong 
increase in public indebtedness. Besides trying to protect social expenditures, Ecuador’s ﬁ  scal framework is 
also aimed at reducing the external debt overhang. In the case of the domestic-borrowing scenario, domestic 
public debt would increase to almost 30 per cent in 2015, up from about 13 per cent in the base year (see 
ﬁ  gure 14). Domestic public debt has been historically low in Ecuador for lack of a developed bond market. 
Th   e model assumes such a market exists, however, hence allowing for the indicated rise in indebtedness at a 
given interest rate. Th   is most likely underestimates the real cost of this ﬁ  nancing strategy as, because of the 
Figure 11. 
Ecuador: Private investment in the BAU and alternative MDG ﬁ  nancing scenarios 
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Source: León, Rosero and Vos (2006), 
based on the MAMS model for Ecuador.
Figure 12. 
Ecuador: Real GDP in the BAU and alternative MDG ﬁ  nancing scenarios 
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Source: León, Rosero and Vos (2006), 
based on the MAMS model for Ecuador.Constraints to achieving the MDGs through domestic resource mobilization  25
underdevelopment of the domestic capital market, the government will only be able to issue bonds at very 
high rates.
Financing the MDG strategy with foreign borrowing would, in turn, lift external debt to unsustain-
able levels. Th   e sustainable level of foreign indebtedness is deﬁ  ned at 40 per cent of GDP in the present ﬁ  scal 
policy framework (World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, 2004). Th   e MAMS model simula-
tions suggest that this critical level would be surpassed by a substantial margin under the foreign-borrowing 
scenario, as the external debt-to-GDP ratio would move up to little more than 60 per cent by 2015 (see 
ﬁ  gure 15). Th   e increase in the public debt overhang would be a concern under both scenarios as the total 
Figure 13.
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BAU Taxes Domestic borrowing Foreign borrowing
target
Source: León, Rosero and Vos (2006), 
based on the MAMS model for Ecuador.
a Th   e incidence of extreme poverty 
is deﬁ  ned as the share of the total 
population living on less than 1$ a day. 
Calculations are based on labour-market 
outcomes for diﬀ  erent types of workers 
as estimated in the MAMS model and 
after applying the microsimulation 
methodology (see footnote 6).
Figure 14. 
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Source: León, Rosero and Vos (2006), 
based on the MAMS model for Ecuador.26  DESA Working Paper No. 36
debt ratio would increase to nearly 70 per cent of GDP by 2015, which would be uncomfortably high even 
with the present high oil price levels.12 Given Ecuador’s track record of defaults on external debt, the foreign-
ﬁ  nancing scenario might raise most worries among international investors.
Th  e  tax-ﬁ  nancing scenario would avoid such concerns, albeit at the cost of slower private investment 
and consumption growth compared to that of the baseline. Th   e MAMS model suggests that direct income 
tax revenue would have to be raised by 3 percentage points of GDP in this case, but further reductions in 
public debt would be gained. Ecuador has ample scope for further tax reforms, particularly in improving 
direct tax collection. Income tax revenues represent just 1.5 per cent of GDP, which is low by any stand-
ard. Tax reforms are politically diﬃ   cult in Ecuador, however; the more so, when they aﬀ  ect higher income 
groups. Hence, the challenge to policy makers will be to convince the elites to contribute some of their 
recurrent wealth to human development and the long-term beneﬁ  t of the country. At the same time, with 
the current high oil prices, there is additional ﬁ  scal space to mobilize the resources for achieving the MDGs 
and the social goals that go beyond that. Th   us, a further challenge is to make the existing framework for 
ﬁ  scal responsibility and stabilization of oil revenues work in order to eﬀ  ectively smooth adequate levels of 
public spending for poverty reduction and human development. Th   is will require policies that enable public 
consumption-smoothing over a prolonged period of time—a challenge to Ecuadorian policy makers—but 
the ﬁ  scal responsibility law and ﬁ  scal stabilization fund established some time ago might provide, if consist-
ently implemented, the right kind of framework to this end.
Conclusions
Poverty reduction and achievement of the other social goals deﬁ  ned in the Millennium Declaration should 
also be expected to yield a “growth dividend”, as higher levels of human development facilitate productiv-
ity growth and economic development. While this may be true, additional public spending to achieve the 
12  It should be noted that the baseline scenario incorporates the recent increases in oil prices which have eased the 
country’s ﬁ  nancing constraints. It assumes that oil prices stay up during the simulation period, but this may be too 
optimistic as oil prices have historically shown strong ﬂ  uctuations.
Figure 15. 
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Source: León, Rosero and Vos (2006), 
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MDGs will also come with a cost, and adequate ﬁ  nancing resources will have to be found in order to ﬁ  nd 
the desired synergy between the economic and social gains of the poverty reduction strategy. Th   e main trade-
oﬀ  , perhaps, is of an intertemporal nature. Th   e growth dividend will take time to mature. For instance, keep-
ing children in school longer for better educational outcomes also implies that there will be a time lag be-
tween the current investments in education and the productivity eﬀ  ects of having a better-trained workforce. 
As we have illustrated in this paper, the way investments are ﬁ  nanced now may aﬀ  ect MDG achievements 
over time. Even in a middle-income country like Costa Rica, where the MDGs are within near reach, non-
negligible macroeconomic trade-oﬀ  s exist. In an economy reliant on export-led growth such as Costa Rica, 
Dutch Disease eﬀ  ects leading to RER appreciation, on the one hand, and tax increases that aﬀ  ect disposable 
incomes and domestic government borrowing that crowds out private investment, on the other, cause lower 
economic growth and less reduction of income poverty, at least in the short run. It makes clear once more 
that achieving the MDGs is not merely a matter of looking at aid eﬀ  ectiveness and eﬀ  ective social sector 
strategies and targeted poverty reduction programmes. It is, rather, more critical to adopt cautious macroeco-
nomic policies that are consistent with poverty-reduction goals. As indicated at the beginning of this paper, 
this requires a view of macroeconomic policy-making that is broader than merely focusing on economic and 
monetary stability, as had been the mainstream approach of adjustment programmes in developing countries 
during the 1980s and 1990s.
Th   e MAMS framework helps identify the main trade-oﬀ  s, and this may better inform policy makers 
regarding how to conduct macroeconomic policies consistent with long-term development goals. Country 
contexts diﬀ  er as well as the policy space available to pursue such policies, and more country-level analysis 
is required to understand fully all the trade-oﬀ  s involved and the implications for the sequencing of policy 
interventions towards the MDGs. Furthermore, much more research is needed to understand the underlying 
quantitative relations. Th   e MAMS framework as applied here goes a long way in establishing these, but as 
yet fairly little is known about the precise degree of synergy that exists between the diﬀ  erent MDGs and the 
productivity gains that can be obtained from higher levels of human development. Moreover, much more 
analysis is needed of the scope for creating more ﬁ  scal space through more cost-eﬀ  ective public interventions 
in health, education and poverty reduction programmes. Existing studies are, by nature, programme- and 
sector-speciﬁ  c, but are rarely conducted with a view to serving broader macroeconomic policy discussions.
Such quantitative interactions have been imperfectly captured in the present general equilibrium 
analyses. Nonetheless, policy simulation analyses of this kind are indispensable when trying to obtain insight 
into the eﬀ  ectiveness of macroeconomic ﬁ  nancing strategies towards the achievement of the MDGs and 
should therefore be helpful in informing and guiding national policy dialogues on these matters.28  DESA Working Paper No. 36
References
Bevan, David (2005). An analytical overview of aid absorption: Recognizing and avoiding macroeconomic hazards. Paper for the 
Seminar on ‘Foreign Aid and Macroeconomic Management’, March 14-15, Maputo, Mozambique. In Macroeconomic 
Management of Foreign Aid: Opportunities and Pitfalls, Peter Isard, Leslie Lipschitz, Alexandros Mourmouras, and Peter 
Heller, eds. Forthcoming, International Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C. 
Bourguignon, François, Maurizio Bussolo, Luiz Pereira da Silva, Hans Timmer, and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe (2004). 
MAMS: Maquette for MDG simulations. March, World Bank: Washington, D.C. (processed).
__________, Anne-Sophie Robilliard, and Sherman Robinson (2002). ‘Representative versus real households in the macro-economic 
modeling of inequality’, Washington D.C.: World Bank and IFPRI (Mimeo).
__________, and Mark Sundberg (2006). ‘Constraints to achieving the MDGs with scaled-up aid’, DESA Working Paper No. 15, 
New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Aﬀ  airs (ST/ESA/DWP/15).
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2001). Una Década de Luces y Sombras: América Latina y el Caribe en 
los Años Noventa, Alfaomega and ECLAC, Bogotá and Santiago: United Nations.
__________ (2002). “La modernización de los sistemas nacionales de inversión pública: análisis crítico y perspectivas,” Serie 
manuales no. 23, December 2002, (ILPES/CEPAL, Santiago).
Escaith, Hubert, and Keiji Inoue (2001). “Small Economies’ Tariﬀ   and Subsidy Policies in the Face of Trade Liberalization in the 
Americas,” Integration and Trade, no. 14, vol. 5, May- August, 2001 (INTAL/IADB, Buenos Aires).
Ganuza, Enrique, Ricardo Paes de Barros, and Rob Vos (2002). ‘Labour Market Adjustment, Poverty and Inequality during 
Liberalisation’. In: Economic Liberalisation, Distribution and Poverty: Latin America in the 1990s, Rob Vos, Lance Taylor 
and Ricardo Paes de Barros, eds. Cheltenham (UK) and Northampton (US): Edward Elgar Publishers, pp. 54-88.
Glewwe, Paul (2002). ‘Schools and skills in developing countries: education policies and socioeconomic outcomes’, 
Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. XL (June): 436-482.
Gupta, Sanjeev, Robert Powell and Yongzheng Yang (2006). Macroeconomic challenges of scaling up aid to Africa. A 
checklist for practitioners, Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Heller, Peter S. (2005). “Pity the ﬁnance minister: Managing a substantial scaling-up of aid ﬂows”, Fiscal Aﬀ  airs 
Department, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund (processed).
Hopkins, Michael, and Rolph van der Hoeven (1982). Policy analysis in a socio-economic model of basic needs applied 
to four countries, Journal of Policy Modeling, 4 (3): 425-55.
Kouwenaar, Arend (1986). A Basic Needs Policy Model, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
León, Mauricio, José Rosero and Rob Vos (2006). “El Reto de Alcanzar los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio en 
Ecuador: Un análisis de equilibrio general de los requerimientos de ﬁ  nanciamiento”, Paper prepared for 
UNDP/UN-DESA/World Bank Project “Public Policies for MDG achievement in Latin America and the 
Caribbean”, New York (December).
Löfgren, Hans (2004). MAMS: An economy wide model for analysis of MDG country strategies. World Bank, 
Development Prospects Group, Washington, D.C. (processed). 
__________, and Carolina Diaz-Bonilla (2006). MAMS: An economy wide model for analysis of MDG country 
strategies (revised). April, World Bank: Washington, D.C. (processed).
Martner, Ricardo, and Eduardo Aldunate (2006). “Política Fiscal y Protección Social,” Serie Gestión Pública no. 53, 
January 2006, ILPES/CEPAL: Santiago.
Ocampo, José Antonio (2005). “A Broad View of Macroeconomic Stability,” DESA Working Paper No.1, October, 
United Nations: New York.
__________ (2002). “Developing Countries’ Anti-cyclical Policies in a Globalized World,” in Development Economics 
and Structuralist Macroeconomics: Essays in Honor of Lance Taylor, Dutt, Amitava Krishna and Jaime Ros, eds. 
Edward Elgar, (Aldershot, 2003).
__________, and Stephany Griﬃ   th –Jones (2006). ‘A counter-cyclical framework for a development-friendly 
international ﬁ  nancial architecture’, Paper presented at the IDRC workshop on “International Financial 
Architecture, Macroeconomic Volatility and Institutions”, New York, 17 and 18 April 2006.
__________, and Rob Vos (2006). ‘Policy space and the changing paradigm in conducting macroeconomic policies in 
developing countries’, Paper presented at the FONDAD-UN/DESA seminar on “Policy Space for Developing 
Countries in a Globalized World”, New York, 7 and 8 December 2006.Constraints to achieving the MDGs through domestic resource mobilization  29
ODI (2003) ‘Results-oriented budgeting: will it reduce poverty?’, Brieﬁ  ng Paper, Overseas Development Institute, 
London.
Rodriguez, Francisco (2006). ‘Have collapses in infrastructure spending led to cross-country divergence in per capita 
GDP?’, Background paper to the World Economic and Social Survey 2006, New York (available from http:
www.un.org/esa/policy/index.html).
Rogers, F. Halsey, José López-Calix, Nazmul Chaudury, Jeﬀ  rey Hammer, Nancy Córdova, Michael Kremer and Karthik 
Muralidharan (2004). ‘Teacher absence and incentives in primary education’, in: World Bank and Inter-
American Development Bank, Ecuador: Creating Fiscal Space for Poverty Reduction, Volume II, Washington 
D.C.: World Bank and IDB (Report No. 28911-EC).
Sánchez, Marco V. (2004). Rising inequality and falling poverty in Costa Rica’s agriculture during trade reform. A macro-micro general 
equilibrium analysis, Maastricht: Shaker.
__________ (2006). “Gasto público para el logro de las metas del milenio en Costa Rica: viabilidad de ﬁ  nanciarlo y sus efectos en la 
asignación de los recursos, la pobreza y la desigualdad”, Paper prepared for UNDP/UN-DESA/World Bank Project “Public 
Policies for MDG achievement in Latin America and the Caribbean”, New York (November).
__________, and Pablo Sauma (2006). “Costa Rica—export-orientation and its eﬀ  ect on growth, inequality and poverty”, in Who 
Gains from Free Trade? Export-led growth, inequality and poverty in Latin America, Rob Vos, Enrique Ganuza, Samuel 
Morley and Sherman Robinson, eds., pp. 204-30, New York: Routledge.
United Nations Millennium Project (2005). Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals, London: Earthscan.
United Nations (2006a). Th   e Millennium Development Goals Report, 2006, New York: United Nations (sales number E.06.I.18).
__________ (2006b). World Economic and Social Survey 2006: Diverging Growth and Development, United Nations (New York). 
Sales no. E.06.II.C.1
__________ (2006c). “Follow-up to and implementation of the outcome of the International Conference on Financing for 
Development,” Report of the Secretary-General, submitted to the General Assembly on its sixty-ﬁ  rst session, (A/61/253). 
8 August 2006, New York.
__________ (2006d). “Recent developments in external debt,” Report of the Secretary-General, submitted to the General Assembly 
on its sixty-ﬁ  rst session, (A/61/152). 16 July 2006, New York.
__________ (2004). World Economic and Social Survey 2004, Part I, United Nations (New York, 2004). Sales no. E.04.II.C.1
__________ (2003). World Economic and Social Survey 2003, United Nations (New York, 2003). Sales no. E.03.II.C.1
Vos, Rob, and Maritza Cabezas (2006). Illusions and disillusions with pro-poor growth, SIDA Studies No. 17, Stockholm: Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency.
__________, Maritza Cabezas and Kristin Komives (2006). Budgeting for Poverty Reduction. Evaluation of Poverty Reduction 
Strategies in Latin America, Sida Studies, Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (available 
from: http://www.iss.nl/media/website/ﬁ  les/prsp_pdfs/prsp2005regionalreport).
__________, José Cuesta, Ruth Lucio, Mauricio León and José Rosero (2004). ‘Health’, in: World Bank and Inter-American 
Development Bank, Ecuador: Creating Fiscal Space for Poverty Reduction, Volume II, Washington D.C.: World Bank and 
IDB (Report No. 28911-EC).
__________, and Juan Ponce (2004). ‘Education’, in: World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, Ecuador: Creating Fiscal 
Space for Poverty Reduction, Volume II, Washington D.C.: World Bank and IDB (Report No. 28911-EC).
__________, Enrique Ganuza, Samuel Morley and Sherman Robinson, eds. (2006). Who gains from Free Trade? Export-led Growth, 
Income Distribution and Poverty in Latin America, London: Routledge.
World Bank (2004). World Development Report 2004: Making Services work for Poor People, New York: Oxford University Press (for 
the World Bank).
__________ (2006). “Th   e World Bank’s Support to Middle-Income Countries: An Independent Evaluation Group Review, 
Approach Paper”, World Bank: Washington D.C. (available from:
http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/mic/docs/mic_approach_paper.pdf ).
__________ and Inter-American Development Bank (2004). Ecuador: Creating Fiscal Space for Poverty Reduction, Volume I, 
Washington D.C.: World Bank and IDB (Report No. 28911-EC).